THE STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT
Motion to Suppress
DRIESSEN, KENNETH LEROY,
Notice on September 16th at 9:00 am, or at soonest convenience to the Court and
the Plaintiff, Defendant Driessen, by this motion, moves the court, requesting a Franks hearing. The defendant had
filed a timely motion to dismiss, prior to the Preliminary hearing. At the Preliminary Hearing Judge Eaton basically, instructed
Driessen that alleging a defective complaint and or a complaint based on false probable cause are two different issues and
the way he understood the motion to dismiss, those issues would require a "Franks" hearing.
Therefore until a Franks hearing is conducted, this Defendant's right to question the validity of the probable
cause of his being the subjected to a traffic stop based on unproven allegations and searched under pretentious reasoning
leading to his arrest and the criminal complaint numbered above have not been addressed.
Suppression of evidence being synonymous with the exclusionary rule and doctrine developed to apply the 4th
and 14th Amendment rights resulted in the landmark case Franks v. Delaware[i] that case holds: when a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that
a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the trut…was included by the affiant…
requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. A valid sanction for such alleged behavior in a case where
the state does not produce a victim ( See: Illinois v. Krull, Leon, supra, at 908[ii]), and the stated probable cause is highly questionable may well be suppression of evidence
and dismissal of all charges. The grounds for such sanctions being ordered by the court are based upon the following points
of law and fact.
1. Driver's License:
The initial complaint, signed and sworn to in front of Judge Norman Yackel on April 6, 2009,
under probable cause states "Complainant states that a check of the defendant's driving record in the State of Wisconsin
revealed that the Defendant's operating privileges were revoked in the State
of Wisconsin and had not been reinstated as of March 28, 2009". (Exhibit 1). The Wisconsin State Patrol Offense/Incident
Report, of D. J. Lewis, dated March 28, 2009, contains what appears to be a two page document relating to the incident which
begins s 03/28/09 13:36:38 From ODIN To DP71. Under additional comments of this page, immediately below Driessen's
name and birth date followed by the time and the date of the incident this paper reads:
RECORD DISPLAYS AN ID-CARD<<< (Exhibit 2) . So although filled
with acronyms and police jargon, the time of the entries appear to reflect that through a computer connection in the State
Patrol Car, Trooper Lewis, before or during the time of the incident did receive information tending to indicate that Defendant
Driessen did not possess a valid driver's license at the time of the incident.
Prior to the
Preliminary Hearing, Driessen submitted a document to the Court entitled Answer to Complaint, to which has attached
a copy Notice of Intent to Suspend Operating Privilege, dated 3-28-09. Also
attached to the Answer to Complaint is a copy of a check dated 2-9-09, part of which was used to pay for Driessen's
Driver's License, which cleared and was deposited the State of Wisconsin Registration Fee Trust account. After the District
Attorney received the Answer to Complaint submission of the defendant; as far as the defendant knows, no one further
contested the fact that Driessen did posses a valid driver's license before it was taken from him on 3-28-09.
Defendant made the fact that he did possess a valid license on the morning of 3-28-09 known the Assistant District Attorney
instead of supplying the source of the information stating that the Defendant's license was revoked, when it was not, he proceeded
to amend the complaint in an effort to deny this Defendant his right to present such evidence to the court as it relates to
his supposition that the traffic stop was in fact conducted on the basis of the assumption of probable cause that the Defendant's
license was revoked.
that the original complaint contained a statement inferring that Driessen's driver's license was revoked when it was not in
itself may not be an appropriate cause to apply the exclusionary rule. The Defendant also requested discovery, which was not
provided to this day, and part of the discovery Assistant DA Bruce Poquette did provide from the State Patrol seems to have
portions missing. Add the Assistant DAs willingness to amend the complaint
to conceal this 'mistake' from the court in an attempt to deny defendant Driessen the right to present this line of evidence
to the court as it pertains to the validity of probable cause for the traffic stop, it can be considered bad faith and a due
process violation worthy of the application of the exclusionary rule. See, Brady v. Maryland[iii] and Mapp v. Ohio[iv]
2. Speeding: allegation from Deputy Knapp's Incident Report Narrative: Deputy Knapp observed that the vehicle appeared to be traveling at a speed in excess of the posted 55 mph speed limit. Deputy
Knapp also observed that the vehicle had a very loud exhaust. Deputy Knapp then
pulled out onto the roadway and attempted to catch up to the vehicle. Deputy Knapp followed the vehicle as it turned onto
Nelson Lake Road, it appeared to accelerate very quickly. As Deputy Knapp
turned onto Nelson Lake Road, he observed the vehicle was already down the road quite some distance and was passing Minnow
Jim's Bait Store. Deputy Knapp then activated his emergency lights and turned
the siren on and off several times in an attempt to gain the driver's attention and execute a traffic stop. Deputy Knapp by his own words written in his incident report stated that he did not turn on his lights until
after he came up with the allegation that defendant Driessen drove in the other lane.
If Driessen had been speeding and that was in fact the probable cause for which Deputy Knapp began to follow Driessen,
not knowing that Driessen was in fact going to turn onto Nelson Lake Road; any rational jurist would assume that the Deputy
should have turned on his emergency lights as soon as he had even reasonable suspicion to believe that Driessen was speeding.
This indicates that speeding was not the reason he followed and eventually stopped Driessen's vehicle. Driessen heard Deputy
Knapp state that the distance of the incident was a mile to a "mile and 1/2" under oath at the Preliminary Hearing. The distance is actually much shorter and the probability that all the antics Deputy
Knapp alludes to could have actually happened is highly unlikely. Defendant Driessen
measured and recorded the actual distance of the incident at less than 8/10ths of a mile and only about 780 feet of that distance
was traveled on Nelson Lake Road. Also when approaching Nelson Lake Road, via Highway from the north, that intersection is
roughly 110 degrees from the direction of travel down 63 and therefore impossible to navigate at high speed and acceleration
indicated by the deputy (see: Exhibit 3, an audio/visual recording of the scene at 00:12 to 3:00). Furthermore, no indication that Driessen was speeding was mentioned in other reports by Deputy Knapp's
agency or in the portions of Trooper Lewis's report supplied to the defendant by the Assistant DA. Considering that all State
Patrol cruisers have radar devices and Trooper Lewis has offered no such evidence of speeding, it is highly unlikely that
Deputy Knapp has any proof or even reasonable suspicion that this defendant was actually speeding. These facts leave little
doubt to the notion that the probable cause of speeding is a merely a fabrication designed to further justify Deputy Knapp's
unlawful evidence fishing expedition of the morning of March 28, 2009. The 4th
and 14th Amendments of the US constitution and many court cases concerning the exclusionary rule also known as
suppression of evidence, support this Defendant's motion to suppress just on the fact that it appears the deputy fabricated
speeding in absence of legal truthful factual probable cause for following and stopping Driessen, see: Mallory v. United
States[v], BECK V. OHIO[vi] .
in oncoming lane: Attached to and printed on the back of a document with a Wisconsin State Patrol Emblem titled Offense/Incident
Report, indicating officer name Lewis D J, dated 3/28/2009, what appears to be the Trooper's words in part, in the 3rd paragraph
second sentence states: Deputy Knapp asked if I had seen the truck on the wrong side of the road, which I informed him
that I had not. (Exhibit 4) attached. Take further notice that according to the timing of Deputy Knapp's own Incident
Report Narrative concerning this case, the last sentence in the first paragraph reads. Deputy Knapp observed that Trooper
Deb Lewis had also arrived on the scene and parked behind Deputy Knapp's squad car. Trooper Lewis had to be right behind
Deputy Knapp and would certainly have been able to see Driessen's vehicle fully in the oncoming lane if it in fact was so.
While "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not written into the US Constitution word for word these words are written into many
cases as legal interpretation of the 5th and 6th Amendments. If one law
enforcement agent claims to have seen Driessen's vehicle "in the entire left hand portion of the roadway", and the
other agent says Driessen had not, for purposes of criminal proceedings concerning Driessen, the judge is to assume Driessen
had not driven on the apposing side of the road. See: State v. Chambers[vii].
muffler: Driessen has submitted an audio-visual recording with sight and sound controls unaltered and on the same levels for
all of the length of the recordings of his Truck and other vehicles to compare the sound volume of his truck compared to other
vehicles on the road (Exhibit 3, at 3:00 to 8:34). Also attached to this motion
is an affidavit stating that no mechanical changes or modifications were made to the truck between the March 28th, 2009 incident
and the date the audio-video recording was made that would change the exhaust noise level.
In the first paragraph of his Incident Narative Report pertaining to the March 28th, 2009 incident the Deputy states,
"Deputy Knapp also observed that that the vehicle had a very loud exhaust.". To
become a reason to suspect a crime was being committed cars, motorcycles and trucks with similarly loud exhausts must be regularly
ticketed or cited for violating applicable statute or ordinance. Driessen's audio-video recording submission proves that enforcement
of such noise violation is not within the regular practice of local law enforcement authorities. Therefore under the 14th Amendment equal protection clause almost every motorcycle and
every semi- truck that went by during the recording of Driessen's audio-video submission would have to be stopped the driver
frisked, vehicle searched, driver asked to do a sobriety test; then any crimes discovered under the pretense of a loud muffler
would have to be prosecuted and the violator should be not given a citation, warning or any notice concerning the loud muffler. Even if Deputy Knapp did write Driessen a civil citation for noise nuisance it still
does not automatically give him the right to search a person or vehicle let alone use an obviously false notion to justify
a traffic stop. Deputy Knapp's actions prove he did not even consider the loudness of Driessen's muffler as valid pretense
for the traffic stop, reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. He did not even write Driessen a ticket for supposedly
violating any law based on noise, see Knowles v. Iowa[viii].
5. Small Glass Jar: Deputy Knapp observed Driessen place both hands in his pants pockets.
For the purposes of officer safety, deputy Knapp asked Driessen to remove his hands from his pockets and walk to the rear
of his vehicle. Driessen looked at Deputy Knapp, removed both hands from his pants pockets and took one step forward, at which
time Driessen again shoved his right hand in to his right pants pocket and turned slightly away from Deputy Knapp. Deputy Knapp then instructed Driessen to remove his hands from his pocket, blanketed Driessen's right arm
and escorted Driessen several steps forward to the side of his pickup truck and instructed Driessen to place both hands on
the side of the trcuk. Driessen did as instructed, at which time Deputy Knapp performed a pat down search of Driessen's Clothing.
As Deputy Knapp was patting the right side of Driessen's pants, Driessen then removed his right hand from the pickup truck
and again shoved it quickly into his right front pants pocket. Deputy Knapp grabbed Driessen's right wrist, removed his hand
from his pocket and placed it on the side of the vehicle and retained his hand in that position. Deputy Knapp asked Driessen
what the object was and Driessen did not respond. Deputy Knapp then attempted
to complete the pat-down search of Driessen's pants and while doing so, Driessen again attempted to place his hands in his
pants pocket. Deputy Knapp stepped back and instructed Driessen to pull his hands from his pants pockets. Driessen did so
and as he did so, produced what appeared to be a small jar from his right front pants pocket and said "look man, it's just
a little weed." In the portion of Trooper Lewis's Offense Incident Report disclosed to this defendant by the Assistant
District Attorney, Trooper Lewis, while certainly near enough to see Driessen and record his movements, she does not make
any mention of Driessen repeatedly placing his hands inside his pockets, doing some sort of pocket pool hand jive dance and
then handing the said small glass container to Deputy Knapp. By all of the other
allegations Deputy Knapp makes to attempt to support his probable cause it is all but a certainty that if Driessen had fatuctually
act in the manner described by Deputy Knapp, Driessen would have been arrested for resisting arrest and probably assaulting
a police officer. Also in what appears to be within the contents of Trooper Lewis's
report it is stated in the fourth sentence of the second paragraph that, "Mr Driessen talked about not being stopped for
a criminal offense and would go off on a tangent about his rights." It would
be highly unlikely that Driessen would be aware enough to consider and comment about his rights and then willingly hand contraband
to Deputy Knapp. It is more likely that Deputy Knapp did frisk Driessen and feel the lump in his pocket being the small container
and after saying " what is this?", Deputy Knapp did push on the outside of his pants with one hand and did reach into Driessen's
pocket with the other and pulled out the contraband himself. Judges most often assume all officers always act in "good faith",
in this case, with so many obvious inconsistencies, assumptions of good faith do not pass the constitutional muster. See:
Beck v. Ohio, Katz v. United States[ix], Sibron v. New York[x] , Minnesota v. Dickerson[xi] and Arizona v. Gant[xii]
here states that Deputy Knapp's rendition of Driessen's performance of the field sobriety test on the morning of the March
28, 2009 is inaccurate and prejudice to the point of being a fabrication. Driessen has written Assistant D.A. Bruce Poquette
requesting discovery concerning the use of video surveillance cameras during the incident and asked that the Plaintiff answer
his question as to whether or not either of the law enforcement vehicles were equipped with video recorders, see State
v. Haefer[xiii]. Driessen submits relative and valid
evidence with this motion in his defense, being an audiovisual recording of him using a DOT certified breathalyzer to determine
his Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) and then performing field sobriety tests above the BAC level allegedly recorded during
the March 28,2009 incident. In the absence of an audiovisual record of the March 28, 2009 incident, a recording of Driessen's
level of impairment and demeanor on another occasion at an equal or higher BAC is the only available method to meaningfully
challenge the Deputies Incident Report Narrative. While the level of one's coordination
and senses concerning when an individual is to be considered legally impaired is debatable and one may even consider Driessen
legally impaired in the audiovisual recording he submitted under similar a Blood Alcohol Concentration; conversely the video
tends to prove that Driessen would not do, say or act the way Deputy Brian Knapp insinuated to support his theory of probable
cause to arrest Driessen for suspicion of driving under the influence on March 28, 2009. Again as in points one through five,
Deputy Knapp's statements in his Incident Narrative, sworn to be truthful, not by him but by another state agent, are questionable
to the point of wanting impeachment regarding probable cause based on field sobriety tests conducted on March 28, 2009, see:
U.S. v. Jannotti[xiv].
7. Horizontal gaze nystagmus test: Driessen has submitted an audio-visual
both an episode of him following a light with his eyes while he is sober (.00% BAC , Exhibit 3, 12:09 to 12:55) and another
episode after he recorded a .137 BAC on a BACTrack S80, DOT certified breathalyzer that uses fuel cell technology, see (Exhibit
3, 12:55 to 14:25 with elevated BAC). During a horizontal gaze nystagmus test at certain angles, near 45 degrees, your eyes
are supposed to involuntarily twitch and this twitching is somehow supposed to vary due to impairment related to intoxication. Once a person understands what a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test is supposed
to achieve and how; it is no surprise that the results of Driessen's experiment illustrates flaws in the test. Because the
HGN test kind of baffles and stymies judges and juries with technical police babble it is of no surprise that law enforcement
agents through some sort of method of "peer review"[xv], like the test and think it is great. If a judge or any averagely educated jurist were
to study the HGN test methods, unless they have a vested interest in law enforcement they would have to find the HGN test
inconclusive and unconstitutional as a method of determining probable cause of legal impairment[xvi].
even in absence of additional discovery lawfully requested by this defendant a preponderance of evidence exists suggesting
that the traffic stop and subsequent search of Mr. Driessen was conducted under false pretenses in violation of his rights
to privacy and to be secure in his person under the 4th Amendment of the US Constitution. Between the false statements
concerning the Defendant's possession of a valid driver's license signed and sworn to in front of a judge, the actions of
the deputy compared to his words concerning the allegations of the defendants speeding, the inconsistency between the statements
of Trooper Lewis's in comparison to Deputy Knapp's concerning the travel of Driessen's vehicle in the oncoming lane and the
search of Driessen's pockets obtaining a small jar under the pretense of a Terry[xvii] stop for officer safety leave serious factual questions as to the validity of the establishment
of the probable cause, see United States v. Dumes[xviii].
The second paragraph of Deputy Knaap's Incident Report Narrative, 2nd paragraph, 4th sentence states: "Deputy
Knapp recognized and identified the subject as Kenneth Driessen." At one time Driessen was held in the Sawyer County Jail
on a $250,000 bail relating to an out of state warrant that was later proven to be void because a person cannot be a felony
fugitive originating from crime where they had already served their time and been released two years earlier, yet Judge Eaton's
peers on the Wisconsin Appellate Court determined that such a warrant was probable cause for yet another charge[xix]. Driessen does write newspaper opinions, some advocating regulating marijuana like alcohol
and tobacco. He also believes that 9-11 and the resulting justification for the
US to get involved in 2 wars is Pentagon war profiteer driven. He stands on the corner with our local peace group from time
to time. Knapp, knowing Driessen prior to stopping and searching him certainly was not of any benefit to Driessen. Driessen
was not on probation at the time of the traffic stop and any assumption of criminal activity on the morning of March 28th
is purely speculative. Since it is common public knowledge in the community that several members of the Sawyer County Law
Enforcement community have smoked marijuana in the past so a prejudice and selective process due to political and maybe even
religious discriminatory practice is plausible, see State v. Kramer[xx]. One other issue is related to the balance
of individual rights and law enforcement objectives is the danger a "criminal" may be to the community if he is allowed to
go free, see Illinois v. Krull under footnote 2. Although any perceived danger and level of impairment Driessen exhibited
in his audio-visual submission questionable as he experimented with Field Sobriety Tests at near twice the legal limit; his
purchase and use of a breathalyzer can keep him from having to experience the suffering of license loss, jail time and fines
while helping to guarantee that the public will be tolerably safe because he will know not to drive if his BAC approached
anywhere near the legal limit. Finally, the legal and factual points brought
forth within this motion and the exhibits attached give the Judge the authority to order suppression of the state's evidence
necessary to find Driessen guilty and therefore Honorable Judge Robert Eaton may dismiss this complaint in full.
______________________ Dated: _September 11, 2009__
Kenneth Leroy Driessen (pro se)
12022 N. Co. Rd. T
Hayward WI 54843
[i] Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) Held: Where the defendant makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause,
the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request.
The trial court here therefore erred in refusing to examine the adequacy of petitioner's proffer of misrepresentation in the
warrant affidavit. Pp. 438 U. S. 155-156; 438 U. S. 164-172.
[ii] “[T]o the
extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed
against [its] substantial social costs.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 352–353 (1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted).The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go
free— something that “offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.” Leon, supra, at 908. “[T]he
rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its]
application.” Scott, supra, at 364–365 (internal quotation marks omit-ted); see also United States v. Havens,
446 U. S. 620, 626– 627 (1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 (1980
[iii] Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) was a United States Supreme Court case in
which the prosecution had withheld from
the criminal defendant certain evidence. The defendant challenged his conviction, arguing it had been contrary to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[iv]Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961) " . . . our holding that the exclusionary
rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but
it also makes very good sense. There is no war between the Constitution and common sense."
—Justice Clark, speaking for the
[v]Mallory v. United States[v], 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957) ''The police may not
arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable cause.'''
[vi] BECK V. OHIO,
379 U. S. 89 (1964) No probable cause
for petitioner's arrest having been shown, the arrest, and therefore necessarily the search for and seizure of the slips incident
thereto, were invalid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 379 U. S. 91-97. We may assume that the officers acted
in good faith in arresting the petitioner. But "good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough." Henry v.
United States, 361 U. S. 98, 361 U. S. 102. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only in the discretion of
[vii] State v. Chambers, 173 Wis. 2d
237, 496 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1992) To sustain a conviction when alternative methods of proof resting upon different evidentiary
facts are presented to the jury, the evidence must be sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt upon both of the alternative
modes of proof.
[viii] Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998),
was a decision by the United States Supreme Court which ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from further
searching a vehicle which was stopped for a minor traffic offense once the officer has written a citation for the offense.
[ix] Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) highlights the general parameters of searches under the fourth amendment. Warrantless searches
are “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specially established and well-delineated exceptions.”
[x] Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(after policeman observed defendant speak with several known narcotics
addicts, he approached him and placed his hand in defendant's pocket, thus discovering narcotics; impermissible, because he
lacked reasonable basis for frisk and in any event his search exceeded permissible scope of weapons frisk); Once outside,
the officer said to Sibron, "You know what I am after." According to the officer, Sibron "mumbled something and reached into
his pocket." Simultaneously, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into the same pocket, discovering several glassine envelopes,
which, it turned out, contained heroin.
[xi] Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366 (1993). Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case demonstrates that the officer who conducted
the search was not acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry at the time he gained probable cause to believe that the
lump in respondent's jacket was contraband. Under the State Supreme Court's interpretation of the record, the officer never
thought that the lump was a weapon, but did not immediately recognize it as cocaine. Rather, he determined that it was contraband
only after he squeezed, slid, and otherwise manipulated the pocket's contents. While Terry entitled him to place his hands
on respondent's jacket and to feel the lump in the pocket, his continued exploration of the pocket after he concluded that
it contained no weapon was unrelated to the sole justification for the search under Terry. Because this further search was
constitutionally invalid, the seizure of the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional. Pp. 377-379.
[xii] ARIZONA v. GANT
(No. 07-542) 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640 (4/21/2009) Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton.
The experience of the 28 years since Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision
is unfounded, and blind adherence to its faulty assumption would au-thorize myriad unconstitutional searches. Pp. 15–18
[xiii]State v. Haefer, 110 Wis. 2d 381, 328
N.W.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1982) Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show the physical manifestation of
the defendant driver's intoxication.
[xiv]U.S. v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3d Cir.1982) "There is no crueler tyranny than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with the colors of justice..."
- U.S. v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3d Cir.1982)
[xv] However, the validity of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test for use as a field sobriety
test for persons with a blood alcohol level between 0.04-0.08 is supported by peer reviewed studies and has been found to
be a more accurate indication of BAC than other standard field sobriety tests. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physiologic_nystagmus
[xvi] End-position nystagmus as an indicator of ethanol intoxication.
Author: Booker JL. Central Texas Analytical
Consultants, P.O. Box 569, Eddy, Texas 76524-0569, USA. The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus
test is used by law enforcement agencies in the United States to determine whether drivers are intoxicated. It has a high
baseline error and a dose/response relationship that varies greatly according to whether the subject's blood alcohol concentration
is rising or falling. Confusion exists among practitioners of the test about whether it quantifies alcohol concentration or
evaluates impairment. Fatigue exacerbates one component of the HGN test, end-position nystagmus. Video tapes recorded by cameras
in police vehicles revealed that police officers rarely comply with the minimum requirements of the nystagmus examination
procedures for which they were trained and certified. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11393940
[xvii] Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968),
[xviii] United States v. Dumes, 313 F.3d 372, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2002), However, the
good-faith exception to the warrant requirement
does not apply in cases, such as here, where the officer seeking the warrant was dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit..
[xix] State v. Baker, 165 Wis. 2d 42, 477 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1991), When prior convictions are used to enhance a minimum penalty, collateral attack of the prior convictions
must be allowed.
[xx] State v. Kramer, 2001 WI 132, 248 Wis. 2d 1009, 637 N.W.2d 35, 99-2580, For a prima facia case of selective prosecution, a defendant must show a discriminatory effect, that
he or she has been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated have not, and a discriminatory purpose, that
the prosecutor's selection was based on an impermissible consideration such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.
In cases involving solitary prosecutions, a defendant may also show that the government's discriminatory selection for prosecution
is based on a desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights or is motivated by personal vindictiveness.
Marijuana Is Legal Prohibition The Crime